The Role of Representative Agents in the Property Tax Appeals Process by Doerner, William & Ihlanfeldt, Keith
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Role of Representative Agents in the
Property Tax Appeals Process
William Doerner and Keith Ihlanfeldt
Federal Housing Finance Agency, Florida State University
2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/61019/
MPRA Paper No. 61019, posted 31. December 2014 04:53 UTC
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE ROLE OF REPRESENTATIVE AGENTS  
IN THE PROPERTY TAX APPEALS PROCESS 
 
 
William M. Doerner and Keith R. Ihlanfeldt 
 
 
Property tax appeals provide property owners with a mechanism to challenge their 
assessments and reduce their property tax bill. Appeals are frequently filed not by 
the homeowner but by a tax representative who often works on their behalf for a 
contingency fee. Using appeals from Miami-Dade County, Florida, we find that 
representatives have a greater presence in higher-priced neighborhoods, which 
makes these homeowners more likely to appeal than those in lower-priced 
neighborhoods, and representatives increase the percentage reduction in assessed 
value, but only because they increase the likelihood that appellants show up for the 
appeal hearings. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The property tax has been one of the most researched of all taxes. Nonetheless, one 
important element of the property tax — namely the appeals process — has been largely 
overlooked by economists. In fact, rigorous empirical studies have only emerged in the past few 
years. 
The property tax appeals process gives owners who believe their property is overassessed 
an opportunity to have a local value adjustment board take a “second look” at the assessed value. 
Because the system of government assessments inherently introduces some randomness in tax 
burdens, having the right to appeal holds the promise of improving horizontal equity.
1
 Weber and 
McMillen (WM, 2010) were the first to study appeals. They used Chicago data to estimate the 
probability of appeal and given an appeal the probability that the appellant’s assessed value was 
lowered. We build upon their work in three respects. First, we use data on single-family homes 
located in Miami-Dade County, Florida, to estimate the probability of appeal using WM’s 
explanatory variables as well as a number of additional determinants that are shown to be 
important.
2
 Second, for those homeowners filing an appeal, in lieu of estimating the probability 
of an assessment reduction, we estimate the percentage reduction in their assessed value, again 
using an augmented set of explanatory variables.
3
 Third, and most importantly, our focus differs 
from that of WM. Their primary interest was on how the probability of appeal and the 
probability of obtaining an assessment reduction are affected by thin markets (i.e., few 
                                                          
1
 The alternative approach to improving horizontal equity is to invest more resources toward getting assessed values 
closer to market values, although achieving perfect assessments may be difficult and an inefficient use of resources. 
2
 One difference between our variables and WM’s is that for reasons outlined below we define the neighborhood as 
the block group while they define the neighborhood as the census tract. A second difference is that our analysis is 
limited to single-family homes, while they include residential units containing from one to six units. 
3
 WM’s data did not allow them to estimate the magnitude of the assessment reduction, only whether a reduction 
was granted. 
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comparable sales).
4
 Our interest is in the role played by tax representatives in the appeals 
process, who according to our data from Miami-Dade County, Florida, are used by an 
overwhelming majority of property owners. These representatives commonly work on a 
contingency fee basis, asking for as much as half of the first year’s tax savings brought about by 
a successful appeal.
5
 Anecdotal evidence from the media suggests that representatives target 
affluent neighborhoods in making their solicitations.
6
 This is plausible because a given 
percentage reduction in assessed value generates more income for the representative when a 
property has a higher value.
7
 Why might this pose an important local public finance and social 
issue? If representatives avoid lower-priced neighborhoods in their search for clients and are 
successful in that they increase the percentage reduction in assessed value for their clients, then 
their involvement in the appeals process will result in the expected percentage reduction in 
assessed value being larger than it otherwise would be for homeowners living in higher-priced 
neighborhoods. This would make the property tax more regressive.
8
 The purpose of this paper is 
to provide evidence on the role played by tax representatives in high-priced and low-priced 
neighborhoods in affecting the probability of appeal and the probability of winning an appeal. 
Our analysis is based on an exceedingly rich database of roughly 20,000 property tax 
appeals filed by single-family homeowners in Miami-Dade County in response to January 1, 
                                                          
4
 Because our variables overlap WM’s, we also provide evidence on their thin markets hypothesis. 
5
 To gauge the magnitudes of the fees we called property tax agencies as well as private appeals companies within 
Florida and throughout the nation. Although flat fees are sometimes used, it was far more common to hear about 
contingency fees, which were reported to be between 25 and 50 percent of the first year’s tax savings and are paid 
only upon a successful appeal. We were unable to find any harder data on contingency fees. 
6
 Such opinions have been voiced repeatedly by major news sources (Kestin, Maines and Powers, 2010; Tugend, 
2010; Nakamura and Stewart, 2009) but the stories rely on hypothetical or singular examples instead of broad 
evidence that might describe what is happening across an entire city, county, or state. 
7
 As reported below, our results show that the percentage reduction in assessed value rises with the assessed value of 
the petitioner’s home, making more expensive homes a particularly attractive target for the tax representative. 
8
  This statement assumes that the burden of the property tax is gross of any income tax savings. If the burden is net 
of these savings, the statement may not be true. This is a complicated issue that will depend on the interplay of a 
host of factors, including the income elasticity of the demand for housing, the magnitude of the rise in the expected 
percentage reduction in assessed value with neighborhood home value, the property tax rate, and homeowners’ 
utilization of the federal income tax deductibility of the property tax. 
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2007 and January 1, 2008 initial assessed values. According to the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency’s House Price Index for the Miami MSA, our first assessment date is right before the 
market crashed and our second assessment date is one year into the housing market downturn. 
We estimate our two models with a number of alternative estimators, including as a subset 
instrumental variable models that treat the involvement of tax representatives in the appeals 
process as endogenously determined. Our results are robust across years and estimators and point 
to the possible need for policy intervention. 
In the next section we review WM and a number of other papers on appeals that have 
been published since their pioneering effort. Section III describes the property tax system in 
place in Florida. Our Miami-Dade County data are described in Section IV. The models we 
estimate using these data are described in Section V. Results are provided in Section VI and our 
conclusions are stated in Section VII. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
WM hypothesize that both the homeowner’s decision to appeal and the adjudicator’s 
decision to grant or deny the appeal depend on access to information on market values. Better 
information is viewed as tempering the perception of individual mistreatment and improving the 
quality of assessor decision making. Hence, WM expect that more accurate information will 
reduce both the probability that the homeowner appeals and the probability that he receives an 
assessment reduction. 
Comparable sales can provide an important source of information on market value. More 
information is available in “thicker markets” where there are a larger number of comparable 
sales within the immediate neighborhood. Another method to establish market value is to use the 
recent transaction price for an individual property (assuming it was an arms-length sale). Hence, 
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to test their hypothesis, WM include both the number of sales that occurred within the 
homeowner’s neighborhood over the past three years and whether the home was purchased in the 
last three years. Both variables are negative and significant in their 2000 and 2003 probability of 
appeal models, which lends support to their hypothesis. The variables are also negative and 
significant in their probability of success model for 2003, but neither variable is significant in 
their 2000 model. WM’s other key finding is that property owners in higher-value neighborhoods 
stand a better chance of receiving an assessment reduction. Therefore, they conclude that appeals 
are associated with regressive property tax distributions.  
A result from one of WM’s control variables has a direct bearing on the current study. 
While they do not explore the role played by tax representatives in affecting the probability of 
appeal, they do include a dummy variable for whether an attorney was used in estimating the 
probability of an assessment reduction. They find for both 2000 and 2003 that homeowners who 
appeal on their own are more likely to receive an assessment reduction than those who use an 
attorney. To explain this result, they suggest that tax representatives “go fishing” for clients, 
many of whom do not have strong cases for reassessments. Hence, WM view the tax 
representative as representing a less success-prone clientele than the universe of individual 
property owners appealing on their own. 
To our knowledge, since WM three papers have been published dealing with property tax 
appeals. None of the papers provide any evidence on the role played by tax representatives in the 
appeals process. However, they do provide evidence on other aspects of the process. 
Hissong and Hawley (2012) limit their analysis to assessing the degree to which market 
predictors (such as prices and housing types) contribute to inter-city differences in rates of appeal 
and outcomes of appeals using 2001–2009 data on 40 municipalities found within Tarrant 
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County, Texas. Their findings show that higher market values increase the probability of appeal 
and the likelihood of filing a formal in comparison to an informal appeal. An informal appeal is a 
meeting between the petitioner and a member of the tax assessor’s office. In a formal appeal both 
the petitioner and the assessor’s representative present their case in front of a value adjustment 
board. 
McMillen (2013) uses data for single-family homes in Chicago for 2006 and a variety of 
nonparametric estimation techniques to study the distribution of assessment ratios before and 
after appeals had been decided. He finds that appeals lead to a modest reduction in assessment 
variability, but the density of extremely high assessment ratios is higher among homes without 
appeals. His results also show that much of the apparent regressivity in assessments is 
attributable to the number of extremely high assessment ratios at low sales prices. 
Plummer (2013) uses data on single-family homes in Harris County, Texas, for 2006–
2008 to investigate whether appeals increase assessment uniformity. Her methodology involves 
estimating hedonic price models before and after appeals adjustments. Like McMillen (2013), 
she finds that the appeals process increases assessment uniformity. She addresses possible 
sample selection bias using Heckman’s two–step approach—which involves as the first step 
estimating the probability of appeal. While her list of explanatory variables is limited in 
comparison to WM, like WM she finds that owners in higher-valued neighborhoods are more 
likely to appeal and owners who purchased their property in the past three years are less likely to 
appeal. 
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III. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE PROPERTY TAX APPEALS 
 PROCESS IN FLORIDA 
 In Florida, county property tax assessors are required to assess all properties at fair 
market value on January 1 for each annual tax roll. Miami-Dade County uses a Computer-
Assisted Mass Appraisal System to produce its assessed values, which has now become common 
practice throughout Florida and other states. Property owners receive notice of their assessment 
by mail during the month of August. At this point they have two options if they believe their 
property has been overassessed—they can schedule an informal meeting with a member of the 
tax assessor's office or they can file a formal appeal with the value adjustment board (VAB). 
Property owners have 25 days after receiving their notice to file a formal appeal. At informal 
meetings, an explanation is provided to the property owner on how the tax assessor arrived at the 
assessed value. A tax representative is not, typically, part of such meetings. Generally, these 
informal appeals only result in a reduction in assessed value if there is a change or error in the 
physical description of the property. At the formal appeal hearing the homeowner (or his 
representative) and a staff member from the tax assessor’s office present evidence favorable to 
their positions. A magistrate, under the auspices of the VAB, decides whether or not to grant the 
homeowner's appeal and lower the assessed value.
9
 
 Table 1 provides statistics describing the 2007 and 2008 property tax appeals of single-
family homeowners living in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Statistics are reported for all 
homeowners and for homeowners divided into those living in low home value and high home 
                                                          
9
 Regardless of whether there is an informal appeal and regardless of the outcome from this appeal, all homeowners 
have a right to appeal their property tax assessment using the formal appeals process. With our data there was no 
way to track how many homeowners appealed formally after an unsuccessful informal appeal. The VAB does not 
record an appeal when a homeowner has an informal meeting but does not request a formal appeal and we take the 
same approach. Property owners dissatisfied with the outcome of their appeal also have the option to appeal the 
VAB decision in Circuit or Appellate Court, but this right is seldom exercised. 
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value neighborhoods. A low (high) home value neighborhood is a block group with a median 
assessed value in the bottom (top) half of the distribution. Because the statistics are similar 
between the years, we focus our discussion on 2008. Also, because our interest is on the 
differential effects that tax representatives have in low-value and high-value neighborhoods, 
comparisons are made between these two types of neighborhoods. 
 [Table 1 about here.] 
 The prevalence of homeowners who appeal is 4.5 percent in high-value neighborhoods, 
but only 2.3 percent in low-value neighborhoods. The percentage of petitioners using a tax 
representative is 62 percent in low-value neighborhoods, but 69 percent in high-value 
neighborhoods. These differences are consistent with the idea that tax representatives target and 
raise the probability of appeal within high-value neighborhoods. The percentage of petitioners 
winning their appeal (about 50 percent) and the mean percentage reduction in assessed value of 
winners (about 12 percent) are essentially the same between the two types of neighborhoods. The 
breakdown of homeowners by neighborhood type is further broken down into those appealing 
with and without a tax representative. The percentage of petitioners winning their appeal is 
roughly twice as large in both types of neighborhoods if a tax representative is used. 
IV. DATA 
The variables we use to estimate the probability of appeal and the percent reduction in 
assessed value models for single-family homes are listed in Table 2, along with their means and 
standard deviations. Three sources of data are used to construct these variables — the American 
Community Survey (ACS), the standardized property tax rolls that the county must submit 
annually to the Florida Department of Revenue (FDOR), and the appeals registered with the 
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county’s VAB for the years 2005–2008.10 These data are used to define variables measured at 
three levels — the jurisdiction, the neighborhood, and the home. Each of these sets of variables 
is described in turn below. 
[Table 2 about here.] 
One of the new variables we add to those used by WM is the millage rate of the home’s 
taxing jurisdiction. Miami-Dade County is one of Florida’s largest counties, accounting for the 
highest fraction (nine percent) of properties statewide. Within Miami-Dade County there are 35 
different taxing jurisdictions for the more than 300,000 single-family residences.
11
 The property 
tax owed on a home equals the assessed value times the millage rate. Hence, a given reduction in 
assessed value yields greater tax savings when coupled with a higher millage rate. This suggests 
that the probability of appeal is higher in jurisdictions having higher millage rates.  
The neighborhood variables are constructed using all three sources of data. We define the 
neighborhood as the home’s census block group. We choose the block group rather than the 
census tract because low population density in the western portion of Miami-Dade County 
(toward the Everglades) results in census tracts that are too large to be thought of as the home’s 
neighborhood. The variables listed in Table 2 that describe the demographics of the block group 
match the neighborhood variables used by WM and come from the ACS 5-year estimates for 
                                                          
10
 There are several reasons why the dataset was not extended past 2008. Appeals have risen dramatically over the 
past several years and the completion time extends well beyond a single year. In addition, major institutional 
changes happened after 2008. First, homestead exemptions increased by $25,000 and it became possible to transfer 
portable tax savings between properties. Second, Miami-Dade County went from being the only county with an 
appointed property assessor to holding elections for the office. Third, the burden of proof in an appeal lessened from 
providing evidence beyond “every reasonable hypothesis” to a “preponderance of evidence.” By using a year before 
the crash and one year into the crash we compare two similar environments which differed only by the fall in 
property values caused by the crash. Nearly 250,000 appeals were filed from 2005 through 2008. 
11
 The tax jurisdictions are uniquely identified by a tax authority code, which is listed on the tax rolls for each 
property. In Florida, school districts are contiguous with county borders so the school and county millage rates may 
differ but every property is charged the same rate. There is an exception where several cities have opted out of the 
portion of the millage rate financing fire services and related debt. Otherwise, any variation in the total millage rate 
is entirely driven by differences in city millage rates. 
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2005–2009.12 The FDOR data are used to obtain the block group median assessed value and the 
number of arms-length sales that occurred within the block group over the past three years. 
These variables also match those of WM. The final set of neighborhood variables describes 
appeal activity within the neighborhood. WM used the percent of homeowners appealing, while 
we use the percent of homeowners who appeal on their own and the percent of homeowners 
appealing with a tax representative.   
Our home level variables match those of WM describing the structural features of the 
home, its assessed value, the change in its assessed value over the past three years, and whether 
the home was recently purchased. We add to this list two variables — a variable for the 
improvement quality of the home and another variable capturing the effects of a 1992 limitation 
under the Florida property tax. Improvement quality refers to the overall quality of the home and 
is based on the judgment of the tax assessor. It takes on six values of minimum/low cost, below 
average, average, above average, excellent and superior quality. The property tax limitation is a 
cap on increases in taxable value that resulted from the passage of the Save Our Homes (SOH) 
Act in 1992. This law limits the growth of a homesteaded property’s taxable value to three 
percent per year or the rate of inflation, whichever is lower. For homesteads who are recent 
movers and all non-homesteads, taxable value equals assessed value.
13
 For homesteads that have 
recently moved, taxable value and assessed value may no longer be equal after the first year of 
tenure depending on the inflation rate. If assessed value increases by more than the cap limit, 
then assessed value rises faster than taxable value and a wedge develops between the two values. 
                                                          
12
 While the ACS also provides 1-year and 3-year estimates, only the 5-year estimates are available for small 
geographic areas, such as census tracts and block groups. 
13
 As noted above, Florida requires that all properties be assessed by the county property tax assessor every year as 
of January 1. Assessed values are the tax assessor’s estimate of what the home could sell for on this date. Hence, 
there is no assessment lag as is common in other states and assessed values are not a fraction of market value, which 
is also common in other states. 
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A large enough wedge can render a reduction in assessed value moot because a homeowner’s 
property tax bill will not change if the reduced assessed value still lies above taxable value.
14
 We 
add the taxable value to assessed value ratio to the set of home variables. The expectation is that 
a larger ratio will increase the probability of appeal. 
V. ESTIMATED MODELS 
We estimate the homeowner’s probability of filing an appeal with the VAB and the 
percentage reduction in assessed value resulting from an appeal. These models are described in 
turn below in Subsections A and B. In Subsection C we describe our approach to empirically 
addressing two questions central to our analysis. 
A. The Probability of Appeal 
Our probability of appeal model includes the same explanatory variables as WM with the 
following exceptions: 1) we replace their neighborhood appeals variable with the percent of 
homeowners in the block group who file an appeal on their own and the percent of homeowners 
in the block group who file an appeal with the aid of a tax representative, and 2) we add the 
millage rate, the improvement quality of the home, and the SOH wedge as explanatory variables. 
The percentage of neighborhood homeowners who have a tax representative file an appeal on 
their behalf measures the presence of tax representatives in the neighborhood. A greater presence 
may reflect more advertising in the neighborhood by representatives and/or a higher percentage 
of homeowners deciding without solicitation they want to file an appeal using a representative. 
We estimate the probability of appeal using four alternative estimators: OLS, 2SLS, 
probit, and instrumental variables probit. Only the models that treat the presence of the tax 
                                                          
14
 There is little or no reason to appeal when a property has been purchased and, after a few years, a sizeable wedge 
has developed between the assessed value and taxable value. Appeals are based on assessed value (not taxable 
value) and the taxable value will not decrease until the assessed value falls back to the level of the taxable value, or 
when there is no wedge. A homeowner will be more likely to appeal when the wedge decreases, or the ratio of 
taxable value to assessed value becomes larger. 
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representatives in the neighborhood as endogenously determined require explanation. 
Endogeneity may arise if there are factors that affect both the individual homeowner’s 
probability of appeal and the neighborhood presence of tax representatives, whose influence is 
not fully captured by our set of control variables. For example, differences between assessed and 
market values can arise in a neighborhood as the result of a land use emitting a negative 
externality. Homeowners and tax representatives are aware of the neighborhood’s 
overassessment, which results from the Computer-Assisted Mass Appraisal System not 
registering the negative externality effect. Tax representatives target their solicitations to the 
neighborhood based on expectations of obtaining winning appeals and homeowners appeal 
regardless of the presence of the tax representatives. When an excluded variable, in this case the 
negative externality, is correlated with both the dependent and an independent variable, the 
independent variable and the error term are correlated resulting in an inconsistent estimate. To 
obtain a consistent estimate, the independent variable requires instrumentation.
15
 
The equations we estimate can be expressed as 
(1)                 
       
       
       
and 
(2)            
        
        
                         , 
where i represents the homeowner and t the year; A equals 1 if an appeal is filed and 0 otherwise; 
R is the percentage of homeowners residing in the neighborhood who file an appeal using a tax 
representative; and J′, N′, and H′ are the vectors of jurisdictional, neighborhood, and home level 
                                                          
15
 There are many sources of externalities that may affect the behavior of both the homeowner and the tax 
representatives that may be unaccounted for by the tax assessor. Some examples include a half-finished construction 
project, a foreclosure, a coastline that has disappeared from tidal changes, and a park that has deteriorated. The point 
is that neighborhood externalities abound and because they may result in the neighborhood presence of the tax 
representatives being endogenous, we choose to test for this and if necessary correct for it using 2SLS. As discussed 
below, we are able to reject the null hypothesis that R is exogenous. 
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variables. Our two instrumental variables, Rt–1 and Rt–2, are excluded from (1) under the 
assumptions that they do not directly affect At and do directly affect Rt.
16
 The idea underlying the 
latter assumption is that there is persistence in the solicitations of the tax representatives. The 
representatives are viewed as soliciting where expected contingency fees are large relative to the 
costs of filing an appeal. In part, these costs reflect the value of time required in preparing for the 
appeal hearing. These costs are expected to be lower in neighborhoods the tax representative is 
more familiar with, as evidenced by prior participation in the neighborhood’s appeals.  
 As a robustness check, we adopted a second identification approach that used variables 
describing the land use mix within the neighborhood as instrumental variables. Specifically, the 
three instruments are the proportions of total properties within the neighborhood that are 
residential, commercial, and industrial. The logic underlying this alternative identification 
strategy is that the land use mix of the neighborhood captures to some degree the time costs 
incurred by the tax representative in filing the appeal. As an illustration, in comparison to 
commercial areas, industrial areas are generally not conveniently located with respect to the 
offices of the tax representative. Assuming information declines with distance, being farther 
away from a client’s location may reduce the representative’s knowledge of the area and require 
the representative to do more research. Distance can also make solicitations and site inspections 
more costly further reducing the neighborhood’s attractiveness to the representative.17 
In estimating dichotomous dependent variables where all of the regressors are exogenous, 
probit is generally preferred over a linear regression model. Where one or more of the regressors 
                                                          
16
 Rt–1 and Rt–2 may not be exogenous to At if whatever causes the tax representatives to target the neighborhood in 
year t persists from year to year. We argued above representatives target neighborhoods where assessed values 
exceed market values because a negative externality has shocked the neighborhood. Appeals coming from the 
neighborhood are expected to alert the tax assessor to the neighborhood’s overassessment, causing assessments to be 
lowered in the following year. 
17
 Our conversations with tax representatives indicated that site inspections occur, but we are not able to say, with 
any degree of confidence, how frequently they occur. 
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is endogenous this may not be the case. In the instrumental variables probit model (IV-probit) 
consistent estimation requires both normality and homoskedasticity of the errors ui,t and vi,t. An 
alternative approach is the 2SLS linear regression model, which offers a number of advantages 
over IV-probit. First, in the case of 2SLS, fewer distributional assumptions are required — ui,t 
and vi,t need not be multivariate normal and homoskedastic. Second, with 2SLS there is the 
ability to test for weak instruments. Aligned against these advantages, there is a possible 
drawback of using 2SLS to estimate the probability of appeal in that the binary nature of the 
dependent variable Ai,t is being ignored. As a result, ui,t is heteroskedastic. However, 2SLS is still 
consistent and correct inference can be obtained as long as estimated standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity (and clustering). 
B. The Percentage Reduction in Assessed Value 
Conditional on filing an appeal, we estimate the percentage reduction in assessed value. 
The model is estimated by OLS, Tobit, and 2SLS. Tobit is used to address possible inconsistency 
resulting from observations censored at zero. 2SLS is used because the involvement of a tax 
representative may be endogenous. As noted above, tax representatives may be aware of 
differences between assessed and market values and target homeowners with larger differences 
in the expectation of winning appeals with large percentage reductions in assessed value. Only 
the 2SLS model requires further comment. The equations we estimate can be expressed as 
(3)                 
       
       
       
and 
(4)            
        
        
                         , 
where L equals the percentage by which the assessed value is lowered; T equals 1 if a tax 
representative is used in filing the appeal;  J′, N′ and H′ are defined as before. Our instrumental 
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variables, Tt–1 and Tt–2, are again based on the idea that there is persistence in the solicitations of 
the tax representatives. Tt and Tt–1 (Tt–2) may also be correlated because homeowners who have 
filed with a tax representative in the past may be more comfortable in using a representative to 
file their current appeal.
18
 
C. Two Central Questions 
One question of interest is whether the probability of appeal is higher in neighborhoods 
with more expensive homes because of a greater presence of tax representatives within those 
neighborhoods.
19
 Our approach to this question can be shown by rewriting (1) to show the 
functional dependency between R and neighborhood home value (V) and by dropping the 
subscripts and control variables for clarity, or 
(5)     ( )        
such that (5) can be differentiated with respect to V to obtain  
                                                          
18
 We also tried the land use composition variables as instruments; however, we found that the highly aggregated 
land use categories (i.e., residential, commercial, and industrial) that we used as instruments in the probability of 
appeal models yielded low first-stage F-statistics in the percent reduction in assessed value models. However, when 
more disaggregated categories were used as IVs we found that the proportion of properties in the neighborhood that 
are financial institutions yielded a first-stage F-statistic of 7 in the 2007 percentage of reduction 2SLS model. The 
proportion of neighborhood properties that are single-family yielded a first-stage F-statistic of 11 in the 2008 2SLS 
model. Adding additional property types as IVs reduced these first-stage F-values. Hence, both the 2007 and 2008 
models are just identified. Tests of the endogeneity of T confirmed those reported below, indicating that T is an 
exogenous variable. 
19
 An editor noted that studies (e.g., McMillen, 2013) have found that more expensive homes are systematically 
underassessed relative to less expensive homes and that this may attract tax representatives to low- rather than high-
value neighborhoods, because the probability of winning may be greater where homes are comparatively 
overassessed. However, what should matter to tax representatives is the expected dollar amount of tax savings from 
a successful appeal, because their contingency fee is a percentage of these savings. The expected dollar amount of 
tax savings for a neighborhood equals the average probability of winning appeals times the expected average tax 
savings conditional upon winning. We investigated differences in expected tax savings between low- and high-value 
neighborhoods by first computing the median assessed value of each neighborhood. We then divided neighborhoods 
into low-value (lower 50 percent of neighborhoods) and high-value (top 50 percent of neighborhoods). As expected, 
the probability of winning is higher in low-value (.54) in comparison to high-value (.50) neighborhoods. Using the 
average millage rate in 2007 (20 mills), the average tax savings from a successful appeal equaled $639 and $2544 in 
low- and high-value neighborhoods, respectively. When multiplied by the probability of winning, the expected tax 
savings equaled $345 and $1272. Hence, while the probability of winning an appeal is higher in low-value 
neighborhoods (perhaps because of relative overassessment), average tax savings are so much larger in high-value 
neighborhoods that expected tax savings are more than 3.5 times greater there. Tax representatives, therefore, are 
expected to target high-value neighborhoods, despite the lower probability of winning appeals within these 
neighborhoods. 
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where γ is the effect that V has on A apart from the presence of the tax representatives, and 
α(∂R/∂V) registers whether the probability of appeal is higher in neighborhoods with higher 
home values because of a greater presence of tax representatives within the neighborhood. There 
are two approaches toward estimating the tax representative’s effect. One approach is to estimate 
α from (1) and obtain an estimate of ∂R/∂V from an auxiliary regression of R on V, along with 
the control variables. The product of these two estimates gives the tax representative’s effect.  
The second approach is to estimate (1) with and without R included as an explanatory variable. 
With R included we obtain an estimate of γ( ̂). Without R, the estimated value of γ( ̃) registers 
both the direct effect of V on A, as well as the indirect effect of V on A working through the 
effect that V has on the presence of tax representatives in the neighborhood, or 
(7)     ̃          (   )  
The difference between  ̂ and  ̃ equals the tax representative’s effect. Because these two 
approaches yield identical results, we report only those obtained with the second approach.
20, 21 
We expect that a tax representative will increase the percentage reduction in assessed value. 
 A second question of interest is whether an assessed value reduction happens because the 
representative increases 1) the probability that the petitioning homeowner or his representative 
                                                          
20
 We find the second approach more intuitive. Estimating (1) with R reveals the difference in the probability of 
appeal that would exist between low- and high-value neighborhoods in a world without tax representatives, while 
estimating (1) excluding R reveals the difference in the probability of appeal between low- and high-value 
neighborhoods in a world with tax representatives. 
21
 Note that in addition to median_av we include from the ACS the median homeowner’s estimate of market value, 
median_hv, in our models. This follows WM. In taking the second approach, we base our comparisons on 
median_av rather than median_hv because the former more accurately reflects the value of homes in the 
neighborhood at a given point in time and it is the assessed value that the tax representative targets in making his 
solicitations. Recall from above that in Florida assessed value is the tax assessor’s estimate of what the home would 
sell for on January 1 of the tax roll year. 
(6)   
  
    
  
  
   
 
 
16 
 
shows up at the VAB hearing, and/or 2) the percentage reduction in assessed value given the 
homeowner attends the hearing. If a homeowner appeals but neither he nor his representative 
attends the hearing, his appeal is denied and his assessed value is not changed. No-shows are 
common at appeals hearings, but only if the petitioner chooses not to use a tax representative.
22
 
To address our second question, we estimate our percentage reduction in assessed value model 
separately for all petitioners and for just those that show up for the hearing. 
VI. RESULTS 
In this section we first report the results from estimating the probability of appeal 
(Subsection A) and then report those obtained from estimating the percentage reduction in 
assessed value conditional on appeal (Subsection B). Subsection C describes our methodology 
for exploring the tax representative’s effect on the expected percentage reduction in assessed 
value (i.e., the probability of appeal times the percentage reduction in assessed value) for 
homeowners living in low- versus high-priced neighborhoods, as well as the results from 
implementing this methodology. 
All of the tables in Subsections B and C report three values for each explanatory variable 
— the marginal effect, the estimated standard error robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at 
the block group level (in parentheses), and the change in probability (or percent reduction in 
assessed value) from moving the value of a continuous variable from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile of its distribution, holding all the other variables at their mean values (in brackets).
23
 
In the case of a binary variable the change reported in brackets is from moving the value from 
                                                          
22
 In 2007 (2008) no-shows equaled 34 (44) percent of petitioners without a tax representative, but only 2 (3) percent 
of those using a tax representative. 
23
 For the OLS, 2SLS, and Tobit models the marginal effect is the estimated coefficient. For the probit models the 
marginal effects are calculated at the means of the explanatory variables. 
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zero to one, again holding all other variables at their means. The bracketed numbers offer a 
convenient way for comparing the magnitudes of the effects of the explanatory variables. 
A. The Probability of Appeal Results 
Tables 3 and 4 report the results from estimating the probability that the homeowner 
appealed his 2007 and 2008 assessment, respectively. OLS and probit models are estimated for 
the specification excluding R. OLS, 2SLS, and IV-probit are used to estimate the model 
including R. 
Recall that we use two alternative sets of instrumental variables to estimate the 2SLS and 
IV-probit models — lags of the endogenous variable (Rt–1 and Rt–2) and current values of the 
neighborhood’s land use mix (the proportion of properties that are residential, proportion 
commercial, and proportion industrial). The results are robust to our two alternative 
identification strategies. Because the two sets of IVs yielded almost identical results, we report in 
Tables 3 and 4 only those obtained with the first set of IVs.
24
 At the bottom of Column 3 in each 
table are the first-stage F-statistics, which are well above Stock and Yogo’s (2005) weak ID test 
critical values. Also reported at the bottom of the tables are test statistics (endog test for 2SLS 
and a Wald test for IV-probit) for whether R can be treated as an exogenous variable.
25
 
Regardless of estimator, the results indicate that the null hypothesis that R is exogenous can be 
rejected at the one percent level. Instrumenting R increases its estimated marginal effect, 
especially in the probit model.  
[Tables 3 and 4 about here.] 
In every equation including R, the estimated coefficient for R is positive and statistically 
significant at the one percent level, indicating that the probability of appeal is higher in 
                                                          
24
 By “almost identical” we mean that both sets of IVs are valid based upon Stock and Yogo’s (2005) weak ID test 
and both yielded similar estimated R coefficients and standard errors. 
25
 The endog test is part of ivreg2 for Stata. See Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2007). 
 
 
18 
 
neighborhoods where there is a larger percentage of the total number of homeowners appealing 
with the aid of a tax representative. This result may reflect an increased likelihood of the 
homeowner being solicited by a tax representative in neighborhoods where the representatives 
are more active. Alternatively, it may be that the homeowner tends to follow other homeowners 
in the neighborhood in his decision to appeal. In contrast, the percentage of neighborhood 
homeowners who appeal on their own is either not significant or is negative and significant. 
These results may reflect the knowledge obtained by the homeowner of the effort required to file 
an appeal on his own. As the number of homeowners who appeal on their own rises, the 
probability that one of these neighbors shares his experience with the homeowner also rises. 
Upon learning of the effort required to file an appeal on his own from the neighbor, the 
homeowner may decide not to initiate the process.
26
 
To address the question of whether tax representatives are more present in higher-priced 
neighborhoods and thereby increase the probability of appeal within these neighborhoods, we 
compare the estimated coefficient on median_av between equations excluding and including R. 
Consider first the 2007 estimates reported in Table 3. In the linear models the estimated 
coefficient on median_av changes from positive and marginally significant in the equation 
excluding R (see Column 1, row 3) to negative and significant at the one percent level in the 
equations including R (Columns 2 (OLS) and 3 (2SLS)). In the probit models the estimated 
coefficient on median_av also changes from positive to negative after including R and in this 
case both coefficients are significant at the one percent level. The switch from a positive to a 
negative estimated coefficient on median_av, with both coefficients highly significant, is also 
found in the probit results reported for 2008 in Table 4. The linear model comparisons for 2008 
                                                          
26
 As we report below, many petitioners who appeal on their own fail to show up at the VAB hearing. Hence, the 
effort required to appeal on your own may reduce both this type of appeal as well as the likelihood of completing the 
appeal process. 
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also show a sign reversal, but median_av’s estimated coefficient is not significant when R is 
excluded. However, as in all other cases, the coefficient is negative and significant at the one 
percent level when R is included. 
The above comparisons provide strong and remarkably robust (across years and 
estimators) support in favor of the hypothesis that tax representatives increase the probability of 
appeal in higher-priced in comparison to lower-priced neighborhoods. In the absence of the 
representatives, the probability of appeal would be lower in higher-priced neighborhoods.
27
 
When the representatives are included, the results show that the probability of appeal is higher in 
higher-priced neighborhoods (especially for the probit models). These results suggest that the 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the tax representatives making the property tax more 
regressive is satisfied. However, there remains the issue of whether the tax representatives are 
able to lower the assessed values of their clients by more than the homeowners could appealing 
on their own. We take up this issue in the following section, but before doing so we describe the 
results obtained with the control variables that enter the probability of appeal models. 
The estimated coefficients on the WM variables are generally consistent with their own 
findings. Regarding their market value information variables — whether the property was 
purchased in the past three years (recent_sale) and the number of sales in the past three years 
within the property owner’s neighborhood (sales), our results match those they obtained on 
whether the home was recently purchased. Recent_sale is negative and significant at the one 
percent level in both 2007 and 2008, regardless of estimator. In all cases, sales is also found to 
                                                          
27
 An explanation for this result is provided by McMillen (2013), who finds that higher-valued homes are 
systematically underassessed relative to lower-valued homes. So in the absence of tax representatives, the 
expectation of winning an appeal may be lower in high-value neighborhoods, possibly discouraging homeowners 
from appealing. 
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reduce the probability of appeal. It is statistically significant in all of the models, except for the 
2SLS models that include R in both years and the OLS model that includes R in 2007. 
Next, we compare the results from our control variables with WM.  The probit model we 
estimate including R comes the closest to the model they estimate (Column 4 of Tables 3 and 4). 
We both find that the proportion black in the neighborhood (–) and the interior space of the 
property (+) are relatively strong predictors of the probability of appeal.
28
 They also find that the 
number of appeals in the neighborhood is a strong predictor. When we replace the percentages of 
homeowners appealing with and without a tax representative with the total percentage who 
appeal, our results are consistent with those of WM. In contrast to WM, we also find that the 
proportion of adults in the neighborhood with at least a B.A. degree (+) and the age of the 
property (+) are strong predictors. The variables that only they find are relatively strong 
predictors are median neighborhood income (+) and the neighborhood proportion of Hispanics  
(–). 
Finally, we turn to the results obtained on the variables (besides R) that are unique to our 
models.  As hypothesized, tax_rate and SOH_wedge are positive and significant. The 
improvement quality of the home is not found to affect the probability of appeal much in either 
2007 or 2008. 
B. The Percentage Reduction in Assessed Value Results 
The percentage reduction in assessed value model is estimated separately for all 
petitioners and for just those petitioners (or in their absence their representative) who show up at 
                                                          
28
 Strength of predictor is judged by significance level and the change in probability from moving the variable from 
the 25th to the 75th percentile of its distribution, which is the method WM and the current study adopt to compare 
the relative magnitudes of the effects of the explanatory variables. 
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the VAB hearing.
29
 The results for 2007 and 2008 are reported in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. 
The first-stage F-statistics for the 2SLS models are reported at the bottom of Column 3 for the 
full sample of petitioners and at the bottom of Column 4 for the petitioners who show up at the 
hearing. In both cases and for both years, the hypothesis of weak instruments is strongly rejected. 
For each sample and each year, the endogeneity test indicates that the null hypothesis that T is 
exogenous cannot be rejected. Hence, we focus on the results obtained from the OLS and Tobit 
models. 
[Tables 5 and 6 about here.] 
No-shows embody a growing group of appellants that should not be ignored.
30
 In 2007 
there were 545 petitioners (six percent of the total) who failed to show up at the VAB hearing. 
By 2008 no-shows were more common, with 1547 of the petitioners (17 percent of the total) 
failing to attend the hearing. As noted above, for those who appeal on their own, the absenteeism 
is probably driven by a later realization that it is time consuming and not costless to gather 
evidence to present at the appeals hearing that would win an appeal. Tax representatives alleviate 
these costs that deter petitioners, in exchange for the fees described above. 
For the samples of all petitioners, T is positive and highly significant regardless of 
estimator or year, indicating that the use of a tax representative raises the percent reduction in 
assessed value. However, when the sample is restricted to only those petitioners who attend the 
VAB hearing the results are just the opposite: for both years T is negative and highly significant 
regardless of estimator. These results indicate that tax representatives increase the percentage 
                                                          
29
 A number of the percentage reductions were so large that they were clearly outliers. Presumably these are 
properties whose market values were lowered by an unusual major event that the county assessor’s Computer-
Assisted Mass Appraisal System failed to register. Approximately one percent of the properties in each year we 
judged as outliers and were dropped from our samples. 
30
 The VAB does not ignore no-shows; they are counted as denied appeals. If they do not wish to attend, 
homeowners can still send in a written appeal, which will be treated as an appeal where a homeowner offers no 
further testimony and will not be classified as a no-show.  
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reduction in assessed value only because they increase the probability that the petitioner’s case 
will be presented at the hearing.
31
 At the hearing, petitioners using a tax representative obtain 
less of a reduction in assessed value than petitioners appealing on their own. The latter result 
matches the result obtained by WM. Recall, they suggest that tax representatives “go fishing” for 
clients, many of whom do not have strong cases for reassessments. Nevertheless, the positive 
effect that the representative has on the petitioner’s case being presented at the hearing more than 
offsets their relatively poor performance at the hearing, resulting in a positive net effect on the 
percentage reduction in assessed value. 
The results WM obtain from estimating their probability of success models are not 
directly comparable to those we obtain from estimating our percentage reduction in assessed 
value models. Moreover, for reasons unspecified they choose to include in their success models 
only a subset of the neighborhood variables that were included in their appeals models. They 
dropped the variables describing the racial composition, educational attainment, and tenure of 
neighborhood residents. We, however, retain these variables in our percent reduction in assessed 
value models because they are found to have significant effects. The following variables have a 
significant effect on the percent reduction in assessed value for both years regardless of sample 
(all petitioners versus those attending the hearing) and estimator (OLS versus Tobit): % appeal 
with a tax representative (+), Hispanic (–), age (+), living area (–), lotsize (+), and SOH_wedge 
(+).  Variables that have differing effects depending on year, sample, or estimator are median_av 
(negative and significant in all cases in 2008, insignificant in all cases in 2007), median_hv 
(positive and significant only for the attend hearing 2007 sample), black (negative and significant 
in all cases for 2007 but in no cases for 2008), bachelors (negative and significant in all 2007 
                                                          
31
 This is confirmed from estimating the probability that the petitioning homeowner or his representative attended 
the VAB hearing. In this model, which included the same explanatory variables entering the percentage of 
assessment reduction models, the strongest predictor is whether a tax representative is used to file the appeal. 
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cases only), tax_rate (positive and significant in all cases, except for the attend hearing sample in 
2008), and ∆AV (positive and significant in all cases in 2008 but not in any 2007 cases). 
The strong positive effects found for SOH_wedge in both 2007 and 2008 are especially 
noteworthy. A higher taxable value to assessed value ratio raises the percentage reduction in 
assessed value. Recall that the higher this ratio, the more likely a reduction in assessed value will 
also lower taxable value, resulting in a smaller property tax bill. Hence, an explanation for the 
SOH_wedge results is that homeowners and representatives work harder to prepare a stronger 
appeal when the expected reward is larger. The findings that homeowners from neighborhoods 
containing a larger proportion of minorities receive a smaller reduction in assessed value merit 
additional study beyond the current inquiry. Future research should explore whether these results 
are due to racial prejudice on the part of VAB magistrates or if these homeowners have weaker 
cases supporting their appeal. 
C. The Economic Significance of the Tax Representative 
To compare the effects of using a tax representative on homeowners living in low- and 
high-priced neighborhoods, we estimated the impacts of the tax representative on the expected 
reduction in assessed value for homeowners residing within two neighborhoods — one at the 
25th and the other at the 75th percentile of the median_av distribution. Our methodology 
involved the following steps:  
1. Calculate the correlation between house values and the presence of tax representatives at 
the neighborhood level. We use the block group as the unit of observation to regress R on 
median_av. The results show that median_av strongly affects R. 
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2. Take the estimated results from the prior step.  Predict R at the 25th (RL) and 75th (RH) 
percentiles of the median_av distribution while holding the other neighborhood variables 
at their mean values. 
3. Based upon the 2SLS probability of appeal model results, the probability of appeal is 
predicted at RL (AL) and RH (AH), holding other variables at their means. 
4. The OLS percent reduction in assessed value results are used to predict L at RL (LL) and 
RH (LH), holding other variables at their means. 
5. Finally, the expected reduction in assessed value is obtained for the low-priced and high-
priced neighborhood by multiplying AL by LL and AH by LH, respectively. 
The results are presented in Table 7. For both years the tax representative is shown to 
favor the high-priced neighborhood. The representative creates a probability of appeal difference 
between the low- and high-priced neighborhood of .009 in both 2007 and 2008. In both years the 
tax representative also creates a differential, albeit small, in the percentage reduction in assessed 
value in favor of the high-priced neighborhood. In 2007 (2008) the expected percentage 
reduction in assessed value is .2066 (.2211) within low-priced neighborhoods. In high-priced 
neighborhoods the corresponding number is .2536 (.2663). Hence, in 2007 (2008) the expected 
percentage reduction in assessed value is 23 percent (20 percent) higher for the high-priced 
neighborhood as the result of the representative’s greater presence there.32 It should be kept in 
mind that this annual advantage magnifies over time, as long as the representative continues his 
greater presence in the high-priced neighborhood. Clearly, tax representatives play an important 
role in generating greater assessment reductions for homeowners living in more affluent 
neighborhoods. As a result, they make the property tax more regressive. However, as noted 
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 The percent reduction is the difference between .2536 and .2066 divided by .2066 and multiplied by 100. 
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above, it is difficult to conjecture on the increase in regressivity, because it depends on multiple 
factors, which will vary across local communities.
33
 
[Table 7 about here.] 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Tax representatives offer to file an appeal on a homeowner’s behalf in exchange for a 
percentage of any tax savings resulting from a reduction in assessed value. The representatives’ 
expected returns are higher in higher-priced neighborhoods, which suggests that they will target 
their solicitations toward these neighborhoods. Because we find that a larger percentage of 
homeowners file a representative-assisted appeal in higher-priced neighborhoods, our results are 
consistent with the idea that representatives discriminate in favor of these neighborhoods. Our 
data, however, do not enable us to rule out the possibility that the greater presence of tax 
representatives in higher-priced neighborhoods is the result of homeowners in these 
neighborhoods choosing, without solicitation, to use a tax representative in filing their appeal. 
Because representatives have a greater presence within higher-priced neighborhoods, 
individual homeowners living in these neighborhoods are more likely to appeal. This fact 
remains true regardless of whether the representative seeks out the homeowner or the 
homeowner seeks out the representative. Moreover, the greater presence of these representatives 
increases the likelihood that a homeowner will file his appeal with the aid of a representative, 
who positively affects the likelihood that the homeowner’s case will appear and be heard at the 
VAB hearing and helps secure a higher percentage reduction in assessed value. Stated succinctly, 
our results suggest that tax representatives encourage homeowners to appeal and to follow all the 
way through the appeals process. As a result, representatives raise the expected reduction in 
                                                          
33
 The increase in regressivity will be less in those communities where the increase in the expected percentage 
reduction in assessed value, the percentage of homeowners who deduct their property taxes from their federal 
income tax liability, and the property tax rate are all smaller within higher-priced neighborhoods. 
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assessed value by as much as 23 percent in higher-priced in comparison to lower-priced 
neighborhoods.
34
 
As noted above, both WM (2010) and Plummer (2013) found that the probability of 
appeal is greater in higher-priced neighborhoods and from this they both conclude that the 
appeals process contributes to property tax regressivity. However, no explanation is provided in 
either paper for why the appeal probability is found to be higher in higher-priced neighborhoods. 
We find that homeowners in higher-priced neighborhoods are more likely to appeal because of 
the greater presence there of the tax representatives. In a world without representatives, our 
findings indicate that the probability of appeal would be lower in higher-priced in comparison to 
lower-priced neighborhoods. We view this as an encouraging result for it implies that if we raise 
the presence of tax representatives in lower-priced neighborhoods to match that in higher-priced 
neighborhoods, the regressivity of the current appeals process may disappear.
35,
 
36
    
One approach toward the neighborhood equalization of tax representatives might be to 
outlaw contingency fees. We spoke informally to multiple county tax assessors and they firmly 
supported this proposal.
37
 We, however, do not subscribe to this approach. Even if a flat-fee 
                                                          
34
 As brought to our attention by Bill Gentry, one way to view the tax representatives is that they are the 
counterparts in the context of the property tax to expensive accountants in the context of the income tax. Both help 
higher income households avoid paying taxes. 
35
 The effects of increasing the presence of tax representatives within lower-priced neighborhoods go beyond 
enhancing the equity of the property tax. Reductions in assessed values may result in reduced total monthly 
mortgage payments, which may result in lower propensities of default, better cure rates for delinquent loans, and 
avoidance of lengthy foreclosure processes. 
36
 The impact tax representatives have on the horizontal equity of the property tax is also worth noting. The property 
tax appeals process allows homeowners who believe their assessed value is out of line with the market value of their 
home an opportunity to plead their case in front of local value adjustment boards. Roughly half the time, the VAB 
agrees with the homeowner and lowers the homeowner’s assessed value, presumably getting it closer to market 
value. Therefore, an important social benefit of the appeals process is that it improves the horizontal equity of the 
property tax. However, our results suggest that appeals may improve horizontal equity more in high-value in 
comparison to low-value neighborhoods as the result of the greater presence of tax representatives within the former 
neighborhoods. 
37
 California tried to take this step in its 2011–2012 legislative session. As proposed in Senate Bill 342, no person 
would be allowed to charge a contingent fee in a matter before any assessment appeal board. The punishment is the 
greater of $5,000 or 100 percent of the contingent fee charged (regardless if it was actually paid or received). At the 
time of this paper, the bill passed a legislative committee and was returned to the Secretary of the Senate. 
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system were to replace contingency fees, higher-priced neighborhoods would still have a greater 
presence of representatives because homeowners in these neighborhoods are more able to afford 
the fee.
38
 Our suggestion is to take a cue from the criminal justice system and encourage tax 
representatives to undertake pro bono work in lower-priced neighborhoods. Where private 
goodwill is not sufficient, public tax representatives could be appointed who would assist 
homeowners from lower-priced neighborhoods in filing their appeals. That is, extend the right to 
appeal to include filings by an amicus curiae or a public tax representative.
39
 
Property tax representatives could provide a helpful check-and-balance against inequities 
in property assessment and equal access to the appeals process. While our findings are based on 
analyzing the appeals process within a single Florida county, the process is the same in every 
county throughout the entire state. Moreover, the main features of the Florida system — a VAB 
that rules on formal appeals and tax representatives that work on a contingency fee basis — are 
common to other states. We strongly encourage further investigations of the role played by tax 
representatives in the property tax appeals processes of other states. The techniques outlined in 
this paper might prove useful as a guide to conducting these further explorations. 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
 Also, as noted by an editor, a flat fee would result in more appeals in high-value in comparison to low-value 
neighborhoods, because in the former neighborhoods more homeowners would find that the expected benefit from 
appealing exceeded the fee. 
39
 We called every state’s regulatory agency that oversees property taxation to ask about the use of tax 
representatives, who they are, and how much they charge. No agency mentioned the use of public tax 
representatives. We recognize that it is unlikely that local governments would willingly take on this responsibility. It 
is more conceivable that this service would be provided by the state agency that oversees the administration of the 
property tax or by local governments under a state mandate. The idea, though, is not novel. The Internal Revenue 
Service operates a Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) program. VITA provides free basic income tax 
assistance to low income earners, persons with disabilities, the elderly, and limited English speakers. The federal 
program was established with the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and began receiving congressionally appropriated funds 
for a matching grant program in 2007. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
     
   2007 2008 
All Homeowners   
 % who appeal 3.27 3.42 
 % of petitioners using tax representative 86.60 66.57 
 % of petitioners winning appeal 50.84 49.99 
 Mean % reduction in assessed value (AV) of winners 11.03 11.76 
 Appeal with tax representative   
  Winning % 52.51 57.60 
  Mean % reduction in AV of winners 10.45 10.95 
 Appeal without tax representative   
  Winning % 40.08 34.68 
  Mean % reduction in AV of winners 15.94 14.43 
Homeowners in Low Home Value Neighborhood 
a
   
 % who appeal 1.77 2.29 
 % of petitioners using tax representative 82.45 61.47 
 % of petitioners winning appeal 54.62 49.73 
 Mean % reduction in AV of winners 12.25 12.75 
 Appeal with tax representative   
  Winning % 58.40 61.89 
  Mean % reduction in AV of winners 11.22 12.75 
 Appeal without tax representative   
  Winning % 37.07 30.32 
  Mean % reduction in AV of winners 19.88 14.86 
Homeowners in High Home Value Neighborhood 
b
   
 % who appeal 4.76 4.54 
 % of petitioners using tax representative 88.14 69.15 
 % of petitioners winning appeal 49.43 50.04 
 Mean % reduction in AV of winners 10.54 11.27 
 Appeal with tax representative   
  Winning % 50.46 55.67 
  Mean % reduction in AV of winners 10.15 10.38 
 Appeal without tax representative   
  Winning % 41.73 37.43 
  Mean % reduction in AV of winners 14.03 14.22 
     
a
  A low home value neighborhood is a block group with a median assessed value in the 
bottom half of the distribution. 
b
  A high home value neighborhood is a block group with a median assessed value in the upper 
half of the distribution. 
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Table 2 
Variables 
     
Variable Description Mean Values Source 
a
 
    2007 2008   
R percent of other homeowners in the block 
group (BG) who appeal with a tax 
representative 
2.786 2.275 VAB, 
FDOR 
 (4.183) (2.664)  
T 
b
 percent of other petitioners who use a tax 
representative 
79.160 60.305 VAB 
 (24.821) (22.612)  
%no_tax_rep percent of other homeowners in the BG 
who appeal on their own 
0.436 1.132 VAB, 
FDOR 
 (0.680) (0.977)  
median_av median assessed value in BG (10,000) 19.563 20.765 FDOR 
 (22.691) (20.980)  
median_hv median owner–estimate of value in BG 
(10,000) 
33.593 33.580 ACS 
 (19.252) (19.190)  
median_income median household income in BG 
(10,000) 
6.105 6.092 ACS 
 (3.318) (3.299)  
black proportion BG population black 0.192 0.184 ACS 
 (0.291) (0.282)  
Hispanic proportion BG population Hispanic 0.523 0.529 ACS 
 (0.326) (0.325)  
bachelors proportion BG population > age 25 with 
at least B.A. 
0.281 0.280 ACS 
 (0.185) (0.184)  
no_highschool proportion BG population > age 25 
without high school degree 
0.208 0.209 ACS 
 (0.143) (0.143)  
owner_occup proportion BG homeowners 0.744 0.743 ACS 
 (0.199) (0.199)  
sales number of sales in BG in prior 3 years 0.936 0.714 FDOR 
 (1.264) (0.918)  
tax_rate millage rate of home’s jurisdiction 7.903 7.835 FDOR 
 (3.276) (3.290)  
av assessed value of home (10,000) 25.578 25.750 FDOR 
 (44.327) (40.707)  
∆av change (absolute) in assessed value of 
home in prior 3 years 
0.560 0.426 FDOR 
 (5.263) (2.658)  
age  age of home 37.474 42.444 FDOR 
 (18.772) (19.086)  
living_area square feet of home interior space (1,000) 1.950 1.959 FDOR 
 (1.010) (1.003)  
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lotsize square feet of home’s lot (10,000,000) 0.001 0.001 FDOR 
 (0.072) (0.073)  
quality improvement quality of home   FDOR 
    below_ave 0.300 0.301  
  (0.458) (0.459)  
    average  0.385 0.387  
  (0.487) (0.487)  
    above_ave  0.008 0.007  
  (0.086) (0.086)  
    excellent  0.003 0.003  
  (0.059) (0.058)  
    superior  0.006 0.006  
  (0.077) (0.074)  
SOH_wedge taxable value to assessed value ratio 0.590 0.619 FDOR 
 (0.277) (0.276)  
recent_sale home purchased within past 3 years 0.290 0.256 FDOR 
  (0.454) (0.436)   
     
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
a
  VAB = Valuation Adjustment Board of Miami-Dade County 
    FDOR = Florida Department of Revenue Property Tax Roll for Miami-Dade County 
    ACS = American Community Survey 
b
   The sample used for the mean of T is those homeowners who file an appeal. 
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Table 3 
2007 Estimates of the Probability of Appeal 
            OLS  2SLS  Probit  IV-Probit 
  (1) (2)   (3)   (4) (5)   (6) 
R(%tax_rep) 
 
0.0086*** 
 
0.0102*** 
  
0.0012*** 
 
0.0562*** 
  
(0.0003) 
 
(0.0003) 
  
(0.0001) 
 
(0.0016) 
  
[0.0235] 
 
[0.0277] 
  
[0.0030] 
 
[0.0031] 
%no_tax_rep -0.0043 -0.0099** 
 
-0.0110*** 
 
-0.0008 -0.0014* 
 
-0.0651*** 
 
(0.0034) (0.0039) 
 
(0.0040) 
 
(0.0007) (0.0008) 
 
(0.0066) 
 
[-0.0024] [-0.0056] 
 
[-0.0062] 
 
[-0.0005] [-0.0008] 
 
[-0.0009] 
median_av 0.0003* -0.0007*** 
 
-0.0009*** 
 
0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 
-0.0025*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0001) 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0003) 
 
[0.0031] [-0.0066] 
 
[-0.0083] 
 
[0.0008] [-0.0005] 
 
[-0.0006] 
median_hv 0.0001 0.0000 
 
-0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0009** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0001) 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0005) 
 
[0.0023] [0.0003] 
 
[-0.0000] 
 
[0.0007] [0.0004] 
 
[0.0003] 
median_income -0.0013** -0.0006 
 
-0.0005 
 
-0.0003* -0.0003** 
 
-0.0110*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0004) 
 
(0.0004) 
 
(0.0002) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0025) 
 
[-0.0050] [-0.0024] 
 
[-0.0019] 
 
[-0.0011] [-0.0010] 
 
[-0.0010] 
black -0.0132*** -0.0093*** 
 
-0.0086*** 
 
-0.0077*** -0.0063*** 
 
-0.2745*** 
 
(0.0040) (0.0028) 
 
(0.0028) 
 
(0.0018) (0.0015) 
 
(0.0325) 
 
[-0.0031] [-0.0022] 
 
[-0.0020] 
 
[-0.0019] [-0.0015] 
 
[-0.0015] 
Hispanic -0.0079* -0.0055* 
 
-0.0050* 
 
-0.0014 -0.0006 
 
-0.0278 
 
(0.0041) (0.0028) 
 
(0.0028) 
 
(0.0016) (0.0013) 
 
(0.0274) 
 
[-0.0047] [-0.0033] 
 
[-0.0030] 
 
[-0.0009] [-0.0004] 
 
[-0.0004] 
bachelors 0.0399*** 0.0139** 
 
0.0091* 
 
0.0170*** 0.0125*** 
 
0.5466*** 
 
(0.0101) (0.0054) 
 
(0.0053) 
 
(0.0035) (0.0025) 
 
(0.0584) 
 
[0.0096] [0.0033] 
 
[0.0022] 
 
[0.0039] [0.0029] 
 
[0.0029] 
no_highschool -0.0001 -0.0004 
 
-0.0004 
 
-0.0029 -0.0014 
 
-0.0619 
 
(0.0076) (0.0044) 
 
(0.0043) 
 
(0.0035) (0.0027) 
 
(0.0695) 
 
[-0.0000] [-0.0001] 
 
[-0.0001] 
 
[-0.0006] [-0.0003] 
 
[-0.0003] 
owner_occup -0.0208*** -0.0002 
 
0.0036 
 
-0.0088*** -0.0027* 
 
-0.1165*** 
 
(0.0055) (0.0030) 
 
(0.0031) 
 
(0.0020) (0.0015) 
 
(0.0350) 
 
[-0.0053] [-0.0000] 
 
[0.0009] 
 
[-0.0022] [-0.0007] 
 
[-0.0007] 
sales -0.0009** -0.0003 
 
-0.0002 
 
-0.0010** -0.0007** 
 
-0.0323*** 
 
(0.0005) (0.0003) 
 
(0.0003) 
 
(0.0004) (0.0003) 
 
(0.0072) 
 
[-0.0006] [-0.0002] 
 
[-0.0001] 
 
[-0.0006] [-0.0005] 
 
[-0.0005] 
tax_rate 0.0024*** 0.0009*** 
 
0.0007*** 
 
0.0011*** 0.0007*** 
 
0.0294*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0002) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0021) 
 
[0.0159] [0.0061] 
 
[0.0043] 
 
[0.0074] [0.0046] 
 
[0.0045] 
av 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 
 
0.0008*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0001 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0001) 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0001) 
 
[0.0137] [0.0131] 
 
[0.0130] 
 
[0.0002] [0.0000] 
 
[0.0000] 
∆av 0.0003 0.0002 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0000** 0.0000** 
 
0.0015*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0005) 
 
[0.0002] [0.0001] 
 
[0.0001] 
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] 
 
[0.0000] 
age 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 
 
0.0002*** 
 
0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 
0.0032*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0004) 
 
[0.0110] [0.0077] 
 
[0.0071] 
 
[0.0032] [0.0024] 
 
[0.0024] 
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living_area -0.0048** -0.0031* 
 
-0.0028* 
 
0.0030*** 0.0031*** 
 
0.1343*** 
 
(0.0019) (0.0016) 
 
(0.0016) 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) 
 
(0.0064) 
 
[-0.0044] [-0.0028] 
 
[-0.0026] 
 
[0.0026] [0.0026] 
 
[0.0027] 
lotsize 0.0008 -0.0008 
 
-0.0011 
 
0.0007** 0.0004 
 
0.0188 
 
(0.0007) (0.0007) 
 
(0.0007) 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
 
(0.0687) 
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] 
 
[0.0000] 
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] 
 
[0.0000] 
quality 
             below_ave 0.0019 0.0022* 
 
0.0022* 
 
0.0010 0.0008 
 
0.0362** 
 
(0.0019) (0.0013) 
 
(0.0013) 
 
(0.0008) (0.0007) 
 
(0.0150) 
 
[0.0019] [0.0022] 
 
[0.0022] 
 
[0.0011] [0.0008] 
 
[0.0008] 
    average -0.0001 0.0023* 
 
0.0027** 
 
0.0004 0.0005 
 
0.0225 
 
(0.0018) (0.0013) 
 
(0.0014) 
 
(0.0008) (0.0006) 
 
(0.0146) 
 
[-0.0001] [0.0023] 
 
[0.0027] 
 
[0.0004] [0.0005] 
 
[0.0005] 
    above_ave -0.0062 -0.0083 
 
-0.0086 
 
0.0013 0.0013 
 
0.0558 
 
(0.0110) (0.0106) 
 
(0.0106) 
 
(0.0020) (0.0018) 
 
(0.0429) 
 
[-0.0062] [-0.0083] 
 
[-0.0086] 
 
[0.0014] [0.0014] 
 
[0.0014] 
    excellent -0.0147 -0.0205 
 
-0.0216 
 
-0.0023 -0.0031 
 
-0.1395** 
 
(0.0156) (0.0163) 
 
(0.0165) 
 
(0.0021) (0.0020) 
 
(0.0553) 
 
[-0.0147] [-0.0205] 
 
[-0.0216] 
 
[-0.0021] [-0.0027] 
 
[-0.0027] 
    superior -0.0159 -0.0161 
 
-0.0162 
 
-0.0023 -0.0025 
 
-0.1084** 
 
(0.0229) (0.0208) 
 
(0.0206) 
 
(0.0024) (0.0020) 
 
(0.0437) 
 
[-0.0159] [-0.0161] 
 
[-0.0162] 
 
[-0.0021] [-0.0022] 
 
[-0.0022] 
SOH_wedge 0.1330*** 0.1318*** 
 
0.1316*** 
 
0.0616*** 0.0589*** 
 
2.5850*** 
 
(0.0081) (0.0080) 
 
(0.0079) 
 
(0.0023) (0.0019) 
 
(0.0284) 
 
[0.0849] [0.0841] 
 
[0.0840] 
 
[0.0930] [0.0900] 
 
[0.0900] 
recent_sale -0.0384*** -0.0377*** 
 
-0.0376*** 
 
-0.0101*** -0.0094*** 
 
-0.4141*** 
 
(0.0021) (0.0020) 
 
(0.0020) 
 
(0.0006) (0.0005) 
 
(0.0122) 
 
[-0.0384] [-0.0377]   [-0.0375]   [-0.0085] [-0.0079]   [-0.0079] 
R-squared 0.1099 0.1251 
 
0.1246 
 
0.2722 0.2913 
  Observations 281950 281950 
 
281946 
 
281950 281950 
 
281946 
First-stage F 
   
252 
     Endog Test 
             Statistic 
   
65 
         p-value 
   
0.000 
     Wald Test 
             Statistic 
        
7 
    p-value 
        
0.010 
          
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the 
block group level. Numbers in brackets are changes in probability from moving a continuous variable from the 
25th to the 75th percentile of its distribution, holding all other variables at their mean values. In the case of a 
binary variable changes reported are from moving the value from 0 to 1, again holding all other variables at their 
means. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table 4 
2008 Estimates of the Probability of Appeal 
            OLS   2SLS   Probit   IV-Probit 
  (1) (2)   (3)   (4) (5)   (6) 
R(%tax_rep) 
 
0.0075*** 
 
0.0122*** 
  
0.0017*** 
 
0.0793*** 
  
(0.0004) 
 
(0.0006) 
  
(0.0001) 
 
(0.0029) 
  
[0.0141] 
 
[0.0229] 
  
[0.0030] 
 
[0.0042] 
%no_tax_rep 0.0001 -0.0021 
 
-0.0034* 
 
0.0001 -0.0003 
 
-0.0196*** 
 
(0.0015) (0.0017) 
 
(0.0019) 
 
(0.0004) (0.0005) 
 
(0.0048) 
 
[0.0001] [-0.0019] 
 
[-0.0032] 
 
[0.0001] [-0.0003] 
 
[-0.0006] 
median_av 0.0001 -0.0005*** 
 
-0.0008*** 
 
0.0001*** -0.0000*** 
 
-0.0035*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0001) 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0004) 
 
[0.0005] [-0.0050] 
 
[-0.0084] 
 
[0.0006] [-0.0005] 
 
[-0.0011] 
median_hv 0.0001* 0.0001 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0001** 0.0000* 
 
0.0010** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0001) 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0005) 
 
[0.0022] [0.0012] 
 
[0.0005] 
 
[0.0009] [0.0006] 
 
[0.0005] 
median_income -0.0015*** -0.0009** 
 
-0.0005 
 
-0.0005*** -0.0004*** 
 
-0.0092*** 
 
(0.0005) (0.0004) 
 
(0.0004) 
 
(0.0002) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0026) 
 
[-0.0057] [-0.0034] 
 
[-0.0019] 
 
[-0.0018] [-0.0014] 
 
[-0.0011] 
black -0.0068** -0.0043* 
 
-0.0028 
 
-0.0059*** -0.0047*** 
 
-0.1453*** 
 
(0.0031) (0.0022) 
 
(0.0022) 
 
(0.0017) (0.0014) 
 
(0.0311) 
 
[-0.0014] [-0.0009] 
 
[-0.0006] 
 
[-0.0013] [-0.0010] 
 
[-0.0010] 
Hispanic 0.0057* 0.0055** 
 
0.0054** 
 
0.0041*** 0.0046*** 
 
0.1472*** 
 
(0.0032) (0.0022) 
 
(0.0021) 
 
(0.0016) (0.0012) 
 
(0.0259) 
 
[0.0034] [0.0033] 
 
[0.0032] 
 
[0.0024] [0.0028] 
 
[0.0027] 
bachelors 0.0278*** 0.0100** 
 
-0.0011 
 
0.0125*** 0.0076*** 
 
0.2064*** 
 
(0.0076) (0.0049) 
 
(0.0047) 
 
(0.0032) (0.0025) 
 
(0.0567) 
 
[0.0067] [0.0024] 
 
[-0.0003] 
 
[0.0029] [0.0018] 
 
[0.0015] 
no_highschool -0.0145** -0.0101** 
 
-0.0073 
 
-0.0081** -0.0067** 
 
-0.1906*** 
 
(0.0064) (0.0049) 
 
(0.0049) 
 
(0.0034) (0.0028) 
 
(0.0647) 
 
[-0.0031] [-0.0022] 
 
[-0.0016] 
 
[-0.0017] [-0.0015] 
 
[-0.0013] 
owner_occup -0.0111** 0.0001 
 
0.0072** 
 
-0.0062*** -0.0017 
 
-0.0121 
 
(0.0044) (0.0029) 
 
(0.0029) 
 
(0.0020) (0.0015) 
 
(0.0339) 
 
[-0.0028] [0.0000] 
 
[0.0018] 
 
[-0.0016] [-0.0004] 
 
[-0.0001] 
sales -0.0022** -0.0011* 
 
-0.0005 
 
-0.0015*** -0.0011*** 
 
-0.0332*** 
 
(0.0009) (0.0006) 
 
(0.0005) 
 
(0.0005) (0.0004) 
 
(0.0081) 
 
[-0.0011] [-0.0006] 
 
[-0.0002] 
 
[-0.0008] [-0.0006] 
 
[-0.0005] 
tax_rate 0.0017*** 0.0009*** 
 
0.0004*** 
 
0.0008*** 0.0006*** 
 
0.0158*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0020) 
 
[0.0111] [0.0061] 
 
[0.0029] 
 
[0.0057] [0.0038] 
 
[0.0032] 
av 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
 
0.0006*** 
 
0.0000* 0.0000 
 
0.0003** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0001) 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0001) 
 
[0.0107] [0.0104] 
 
[0.0101] 
 
[0.0003] [0.0002] 
 
[0.0002] 
∆av 0.0008** 0.0007* 
 
0.0007* 
 
0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 
0.0039*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) 
 
(0.0004) 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0011) 
 
[0.0002] [0.0002] 
 
[0.0002] 
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] 
 
[0.0000] 
age 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 
 
0.0001*** 
 
0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 
0.0020*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0003) 
 
[0.0071] [0.0050] 
 
[0.0037] 
 
[0.0024] [0.0021] 
 
[0.0018] 
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living_area -0.0019 -0.0011 
 
-0.0006 
 
0.0033*** 0.0034*** 
 
0.1116*** 
 
(0.0014) (0.0012) 
 
(0.0012) 
 
(0.0004) (0.0003) 
 
(0.0067) 
 
[-0.0017] [-0.0010] 
 
[-0.0005] 
 
[0.0029] [0.0030] 
 
[0.0030] 
lotsize -0.0013 -0.0018 
 
-0.0021* 
 
-0.2168 -0.1595 
 
-5.2520** 
 
(0.0015) (0.0013) 
 
(0.0012) 
 
(0.1331) (0.1166) 
 
(2.1118) 
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] 
 
[0.0000] 
 
[-0.0001] [-0.0001] 
 
[-0.0001] 
quality 
             below_ave 0.0020 0.0023** 
 
0.0025** 
 
0.0012* 0.0012** 
 
0.0375*** 
 
(0.0014) (0.0011) 
 
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0007) (0.0006) 
 
(0.0142) 
 
[0.0020] [0.0023] 
 
[0.0025] 
 
[0.0012] [0.0012] 
 
[0.0012] 
    average 0.0006 0.0022* 
 
0.0032*** 
 
0.0006 0.0008 
 
0.0303** 
 
(0.0013) (0.0011) 
 
(0.0012) 
 
(0.0007) (0.0006) 
 
(0.0138) 
 
[0.0006] [0.0022] 
 
[0.0032] 
 
[0.0006] [0.0008] 
 
[0.0009] 
    above_ave -0.0034 -0.0037 
 
-0.0039 
 
0.0004 0.0004 
 
0.0130 
 
(0.0081) (0.0077) 
 
(0.0076) 
 
(0.0018) (0.0016) 
 
(0.0459) 
 
[-0.0034] [-0.0037] 
 
[-0.0039] 
 
[0.0004] [0.0004] 
 
[0.0004] 
    excellent 0.0021 -0.0005 
 
-0.0022 
 
-0.0010 -0.0017 
 
-0.0648 
 
(0.0166) (0.0161) 
 
(0.0159) 
 
(0.0029) (0.0027) 
 
(0.0584) 
 
[0.0021] [-0.0005] 
 
[-0.0022] 
 
[-0.0010] [-0.0016] 
 
[-0.0019] 
    superior -0.0045 -0.0080 
 
-0.0099 
 
-0.0009 -0.0019 
 
-0.0651 
 
(0.0141) (0.0141) 
 
(0.0148) 
 
(0.0024) (0.0023) 
 
(0.0477) 
 
[-0.0045] [-0.0080] 
 
[-0.0099] 
 
[-0.0009] [-0.0017] 
 
[-0.0019] 
SOH_wedge 0.1229*** 0.1231*** 
 
0.1232*** 
 
0.0763*** 0.0750*** 
 
2.4204*** 
 
(0.0059) (0.0059) 
 
(0.0059) 
 
(0.0019) (0.0016) 
 
(0.0288) 
 
[0.0760] [0.0762] 
 
[0.0762] 
 
[0.0892] [0.0882] 
 
[0.0878] 
recent_sale -0.0127*** -0.0126*** 
 
-0.0126*** 
 
-0.0048*** -0.0047*** 
 
-0.1483*** 
 
(0.0014) (0.0014) 
 
(0.0014) 
 
(0.0005) (0.0004) 
 
(0.0117) 
 
[-0.0127] [-0.0126]   [-0.0126]   [-0.0044] [-0.0043]   [-0.0042] 
R-squared 0.0700 0.0746 
 
0.0728 
 
0.2060 0.2135 
  Observations 272710 272710 
 
272699 
 
272710 272710 
 
272699 
First-stage F 
   
188 
     Endog Test 
             Statistic 
   
65 
         p-value 
   
0.000 
     Wald Test 
             Statistic 
        
200 
    p-value                 0.000 
          
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the 
block group level. Numbers in brackets are changes in probability from moving a continuous variable from the 
25th to the 75th percentile of its distribution, holding all other variables at their mean values. In the case of a 
binary variable changes reported are from moving the value from 0 to 1, again holding all other variables at their 
means. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table 5 
2007 Estimates of the Percentage Reduction in Assessed Value 
         
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
 
Tobit 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
  All At Hearing   All At Hearing   All At Hearing 
T(tax_rep) 0.6793** -1.5094*** 
 
0.4079 -1.9676** 
 
1.9721*** -2.5683*** 
 
(0.2724) (0.3748) 
 
(0.6990) (0.9806) 
 
(0.5553) (0.6184) 
 
[0.6793] [-1.5094] 
 
[0.4079] [-1.9676] 
 
[1.9721] [-2.5682] 
R(%tax_rep) 0.0656*** 0.0641*** 
 
0.0670*** 0.0657*** 
 
0.0885*** 0.0853*** 
 
(0.0226) (0.0226) 
 
(0.0233) (0.0234) 
 
(0.0317) (0.0307) 
 
[0.5300] [0.5216] 
 
[0.5411] [0.5354] 
 
[0.7154] [0.6948] 
%no_tax_rep -0.0923 -0.1282 
 
-0.1110 -0.1552 
 
-0.1562 -0.2368 
 
(0.1529) (0.1737) 
 
(0.1543) (0.1771) 
 
(0.3010) (0.3282) 
 
[-0.0795] [-0.1080] 
 
[-0.0957] [-0.1308] 
 
[-0.1346] [-0.1996] 
median_av -0.0039 -0.0033 
 
-0.0040 -0.0034 
 
-0.0019 -0.0010 
 
(0.0032) (0.0033) 
 
(0.0032) (0.0034) 
 
(0.0053) (0.0055) 
 
[-0.1274] [-0.1106] 
 
[-0.1294] [-0.1140] 
 
[-0.0608] [-0.0338] 
median_hv 0.0123 0.0169* 
 
0.0123 0.0172* 
 
0.0259 0.0344** 
 
(0.0085) (0.0089) 
 
(0.0085) (0.0089) 
 
(0.0161) (0.0162) 
 
[0.4909] [0.6785] 
 
[0.4936] [0.6893] 
 
[1.0360] [1.3773] 
median_inc. 0.0546 0.0500 
 
0.0544 0.0492 
 
0.0926 0.0734 
 
(0.0423) (0.0443) 
 
(0.0422) (0.0440) 
 
(0.0889) (0.0887) 
 
[0.3124] [0.2931] 
 
[0.3115] [0.2885] 
 
[0.5298] [0.4306] 
black -2.3734*** -2.6841*** 
 
-2.3692*** -2.6799*** 
 
-3.7907*** -4.1272*** 
 
(0.7197) (0.7559) 
 
(0.7190) (0.7545) 
 
(1.3122) (1.3040) 
 
[-0.2461] [-0.2784] 
 
[-0.2457] [-0.2779] 
 
[-0.3931] [-0.4280] 
Hispanic -2.1163*** -2.3809*** 
 
-2.1084*** -2.3729*** 
 
-3.4259*** -3.7272*** 
 
(0.6087) (0.6428) 
 
(0.6070) (0.6406) 
 
(1.1022) (1.1085) 
 
[-1.0070] [-1.1329] 
 
[-1.0032] [-1.1291] 
 
[-1.6301] [-1.7735] 
bachelors -3.4971*** -4.2550*** 
 
-3.4736*** -4.2449*** 
 
-5.5631*** -6.7755*** 
 
(1.1649) (1.2035) 
 
(1.1597) (1.2004) 
 
(2.1557) (2.1123) 
 
[-1.5035] [-1.8325] 
 
[-1.4934] [-1.8281] 
 
[-2.3918] [-2.9179] 
no_highschool 0.2871 0.1627 
 
0.2738 0.1419 
 
-0.1289 -0.4389 
 
(1.4819) (1.5647) 
 
(1.4798) (1.5627) 
 
(2.6986) (2.7072) 
 
[0.0627] [0.0357] 
 
[0.0598] [0.0311] 
 
[-0.0282] [-0.0962] 
owner_occup -1.5302* -1.5170* 
 
-1.5402* -1.5220* 
 
-2.9804** -2.7389** 
 
(0.8025) (0.8350) 
 
(0.8048) (0.8353) 
 
(1.3761) (1.3700) 
 
[-0.4554] [-0.4539] 
 
[-0.4584] [-0.4554] 
 
[-0.8869] [-0.8195] 
sales -0.0453 -0.0325 
 
-0.0431 -0.0289 
 
-0.1197 -0.0717 
 
(0.1357) (0.1545) 
 
(0.1356) (0.1546) 
 
(0.3054) (0.3257) 
 
[-0.0217] [-0.0153] 
 
[-0.0207] [-0.0136] 
 
[-0.0575] [-0.0337] 
tax_rate 0.1007** 0.0988** 
 
0.1014** 0.0989** 
 
0.1868** 0.1667** 
 
(0.0422) (0.0444) 
 
(0.0419) (0.0443) 
 
(0.0780) (0.0780) 
 
[0.7532] [0.7389] 
 
[0.7583] [0.7397] 
 
[1.3974] [1.2467] 
av 0.0038** 0.0036** 
 
0.0038** 0.0037** 
 
0.0074** 0.0072** 
 
(0.0017) (0.0018) 
 
(0.0017) (0.0018) 
 
(0.0031) (0.0031) 
 
[0.2355] [0.2369] 
 
[0.2360] [0.2387] 
 
[0.4584] [0.4688] 
∆av 0.0155 0.0248 
 
0.0150 0.0239 
 
0.0234 0.0333 
 
(0.0156) (0.0210) 
 
(0.0154) (0.0207) 
 
(0.0209) (0.0263) 
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[0.0114] [0.0175] 
 
[0.0110] [0.0169] 
 
[0.0171] [0.0235] 
age 0.0230*** 0.0224*** 
 
0.0230*** 0.0222*** 
 
0.0352*** 0.0315** 
 
(0.0073) (0.0076) 
 
(0.0073) (0.0077) 
 
(0.0130) (0.0129) 
 
[0.7833] [0.7606] 
 
[0.7820] [0.7556] 
 
[1.1958] [1.0707] 
living_area -0.5245*** -0.5451*** 
 
-0.5224*** -0.5439*** 
 
-0.9557*** -0.9858*** 
 
(0.1097) (0.1134) 
 
(0.1086) (0.1128) 
 
(0.2280) (0.2276) 
 
[-0.9756] [-1.0292] 
 
[-0.9717] [-1.0268] 
 
[-1.7776] [-1.8612] 
lotsize 206.067*** 
219.8514**
* 
 
205.9171**
* 
219.4467**
* 
 
330.7450**
* 
337.0110**
* 
 
(55.5284) (56.6309) 
 
(55.6016) (56.8291) 
 
(77.4174) (76.7323) 
 
[0.1649] [0.1759] 
 
[0.1647] [0.1756] 
 
[0.2646] [0.2696] 
quality 
            below_ave 0.0974 0.1157 
 
0.0987 0.1161 
 
-0.1596 -0.1411 
 
(0.3148) (0.3318) 
 
(0.3144) (0.3311) 
 
(0.5953) (0.5939) 
 
[0.0974] [0.1157] 
 
[0.0987] [0.1161] 
 
[-0.1596] [-0.1411] 
    average 0.0513 0.0703 
 
0.0505 0.0692 
 
0.0207 0.0678 
 
(0.2718) (0.2863) 
 
(0.2710) (0.2855) 
 
(0.5176) (0.5160) 
 
[0.0513] [0.0703] 
 
[0.0505] [0.0692] 
 
[0.0207] [0.0678] 
    above_ave 0.0159 0.0279 
 
0.0224 0.0341 
 
-0.4233 -0.4133 
 
(0.6304) (0.6530) 
 
(0.6298) (0.6520) 
 
(1.4105) (1.4015) 
 
[0.0159] [0.0279] 
 
[0.0224] [0.0342] 
 
[-0.4233] [-0.4133] 
    excellent -0.0105 0.0751 
 
-0.0121 0.0725 
 
-0.6812 -0.4613 
 
(0.7360) (0.7609) 
 
(0.7339) (0.7585) 
 
(1.8420) (1.8103) 
 
[-0.0105] [0.0751] 
 
[-0.0121] [0.0725] 
 
[-0.6812] [-0.4613] 
    superior 0.1268 0.1541 
 
0.1265 0.1541 
 
0.0286 0.0578 
 
(0.6725) (0.6888) 
 
(0.6702) (0.6854) 
 
(1.4858) (1.4625) 
 
[0.1268] [0.1541] 
 
[0.1265] [0.1541] 
 
[0.0286] [0.0578] 
SOH_wedge 9.5777*** 10.0551*** 
 
9.5900*** 10.0456*** 
 
47.4678*** 47.2656*** 
 
(0.4283) (0.4690) 
 
(0.4202) (0.4736) 
 
(3.2943) (3.3124) 
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] 
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] 
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] 
recent_sale -0.3316 -0.2158 
 
-0.3480* -0.2329 
 
-0.5839 -0.3296 
 
(0.2034) (0.2137) 
 
(0.1991) (0.2095) 
 
(0.3718) (0.3720) 
 
[-0.3316] [-0.2158]   [-0.3480] [-0.2329]   [-0.5839] [-0.3296] 
R-squared 0.1556 0.1675 
 
0.1554 0.1672 
 
0.0640 0.0657 
Observations 9088 8543 
 
9088 8543 
 
9088 8543 
First-stage F 
   
54 53 
   Endog Test 
            Statistic 
   
0.087 0.131 
       p-value       0.768 0.717       
         
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the 
block group level. Numbers in brackets are changes in probability from moving a continuous variable from the 
25th to the 75th percentile of its distribution, holding all other variables at their mean values. In the case of a 
binary variable changes reported are from moving the value from 0 to 1, again holding all other variables at their 
means. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table 6 
2008 Estimates of the Percentage Reduction in Assessed Value 
         
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
 
Tobit 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
  All At Hearing   All At Hearing   All At Hearing 
T(tax_rep) 1.4318*** -1.3017*** 
 
1.9137*** -0.9361 
 
3.9979*** -1.9686*** 
 
(0.1820) (0.2369) 
 
(0.4246) (0.5911) 
 
(0.3888) (0.3771) 
 
[1.4318] [-1.3017] 
 
[1.9137] [-0.9361] 
 
[3.9979] [-1.9686] 
R(%tax_rep) 0.1042** 0.0909* 
 
0.0979** 0.0877* 
 
0.1494** 0.1264** 
 
(0.0488) (0.0476) 
 
(0.0473) (0.0466) 
 
(0.0637) (0.0578) 
 
[0.4169] [0.3867] 
 
[0.3917] [0.3731] 
 
[0.5980] [0.5380] 
%no_tax_rep 0.3282*** 0.2963** 
 
0.3602*** 0.3171** 
 
0.5311*** 0.3852** 
 
(0.1151) (0.1322) 
 
(0.1199) (0.1367) 
 
(0.1897) (0.1839) 
 
[0.3938] [0.3649] 
 
[0.4321] [0.3905] 
 
[0.6372] [0.4744] 
median_av -0.0115** -0.0117** 
 
-0.0116** -0.0117** 
 
-0.0156** -0.0161** 
 
(0.0051) (0.0051) 
 
(0.0051) (0.0051) 
 
(0.0075) (0.0072) 
 
[-0.2474] [-0.2832] 
 
[-0.2495] [-0.2840] 
 
[-0.3367] [-0.3899] 
median_hv 0.0001 0.0021 
 
-0.0001 0.0020 
 
0.0057 0.0085 
 
(0.0086) (0.0095) 
 
(0.0086) (0.0094) 
 
(0.0159) (0.0151) 
 
[0.0023] [0.0645] 
 
[-0.0039] [0.0624] 
 
[0.1587] [0.2595] 
median_inc. -0.0246 -0.0232 
 
-0.0243 -0.0235 
 
-0.1013 -0.0860 
 
(0.0415) (0.0444) 
 
(0.0414) (0.0442) 
 
(0.0791) (0.0727) 
 
[-0.1029] [-0.1052] 
 
[-0.1016] [-0.1066] 
 
[-0.4233] [-0.3896] 
black -0.0418 0.0605 
 
-0.0253 0.0674 
 
-0.3568 -0.1928 
 
(0.6300) (0.7329) 
 
(0.6299) (0.7329) 
 
(1.1296) (1.0945) 
 
[-0.0045] [0.0064] 
 
[-0.0027] [0.0072] 
 
[-0.0386] [-0.0205] 
Hispanic -1.7438*** -1.9481*** 
 
-1.7562*** -1.9594*** 
 
-3.0563*** -2.8576*** 
 
(0.5758) (0.6620) 
 
(0.5743) (0.6619) 
 
(1.0398) (1.0263) 
 
[-0.9533] [-1.0417] 
 
[-0.9600] [-1.0478] 
 
[-1.6707] [-1.5281] 
bachelors 0.6305 -0.1631 
 
0.5677 -0.1798 
 
1.8598 0.0126 
 
(1.0300) (1.1509) 
 
(1.0283) (1.1489) 
 
(1.9644) (1.8625) 
 
[0.2288] [-0.0639] 
 
[0.2060] [-0.0705] 
 
[0.6748] [0.0049] 
no_highschool -0.0301 -0.0781 
 
0.0221 -0.0473 
 
-0.8137 -0.9742 
 
(1.3919) (1.6232) 
 
(1.3925) (1.6266) 
 
(2.5146) (2.4459) 
 
[-0.0065] [-0.0167] 
 
[0.0048] [-0.0101] 
 
[-0.1761] [-0.2087] 
owner_occup -1.3250* -1.3255 
 
-1.2851* -1.3151 
 
-2.2470* -1.8531 
 
(0.7162) (0.8211) 
 
(0.7069) (0.8151) 
 
(1.2773) (1.2702) 
 
[-0.3784] [-0.3833] 
 
[-0.3670] [-0.3803] 
 
[-0.6418] [-0.5358] 
sales -0.0898 -0.0935 
 
-0.0755 -0.0887 
 
-0.4262 -0.2395 
 
(0.1221) (0.1676) 
 
(0.1227) (0.1687) 
 
(0.3434) (0.3643) 
 
[-0.0332] [-0.0337] 
 
[-0.0279] [-0.0319] 
 
[-0.1577] [-0.0862] 
tax_rate 0.0712* 0.0460 
 
0.0686* 0.0463 
 
0.1622** 0.0779 
 
(0.0364) (0.0421) 
 
(0.0362) (0.0420) 
 
(0.0686) (0.0675) 
 
[0.4938] [0.3190] 
 
[0.4757] [0.3209] 
 
[1.1246] [0.5404] 
av 0.0053*** 0.0056*** 
 
0.0053*** 0.0055*** 
 
0.0088*** 0.0094*** 
 
(0.0015) (0.0016) 
 
(0.0015) (0.0016) 
 
(0.0026) (0.0027) 
 
[0.2036] [0.2440] 
 
[0.2048] [0.2431] 
 
[0.3399] [0.4129] 
∆av 0.0137* 0.0112* 
 
0.0134* 0.0112* 
 
0.0314*** 0.0229*** 
 
(0.0071) (0.0062) 
 
(0.0071) (0.0062) 
 
(0.0102) (0.0082) 
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[0.0099] [0.0081] 
 
[0.0097] [0.0080] 
 
[0.0227] [0.0165] 
age 0.0183** 0.0205** 
 
0.0181** 0.0205** 
 
0.0321** 0.0304** 
 
(0.0079) (0.0087) 
 
(0.0079) (0.0087) 
 
(0.0141) (0.0140) 
 
[0.5668] [0.6144] 
 
[0.5612] [0.6135] 
 
[0.9961] [0.9116] 
living_area -0.5148*** -0.5462*** 
 
-0.5230*** -0.5486*** 
 
-0.8651*** -0.8978*** 
 
(0.0899) (0.0999) 
 
(0.0911) (0.1004) 
 
(0.1997) (0.1914) 
 
[-0.7403] [-0.8365] 
 
[-0.7521] [-0.8401] 
 
[-1.2441] [-1.3749] 
lotsize 124.7052*** 122.5802*** 
 
122.7575*** 121.9064*** 
 
196.3337** 173.8870** 
 
(41.0530) (41.8093) 
 
(40.4142) (41.5544) 
 
(77.9914) (69.1827) 
 
[0.0809] [0.0828] 
 
[0.0797] [0.0824] 
 
[0.1274] [0.1175] 
quality 
            below_ave -0.0305 -0.0780 
 
-0.0236 -0.0727 
 
0.0038 -0.0574 
 
(0.2652) (0.3045) 
 
(0.2637) (0.3029) 
 
(0.4949) (0.4850) 
 
[-0.0305] [-0.0780] 
 
[-0.0236] [-0.0727] 
 
[0.0038] [-0.0574] 
    average -0.1969 -0.2028 
 
-0.1904 -0.2030 
 
-0.3156 -0.2536 
 
(0.2389) (0.2728) 
 
(0.2379) (0.2727) 
 
(0.4523) (0.4383) 
 
[-0.1969] [-0.2028] 
 
[-0.1904] [-0.2030] 
 
[-0.3156] [-0.2536] 
    above_ave 0.2554 0.2272 
 
0.2447 0.2267 
 
0.4154 0.1367 
 
(0.5185) (0.5196) 
 
(0.5196) (0.5190) 
 
(1.0427) (0.9318) 
 
[0.2554] [0.2272] 
 
[0.2447] [0.2267] 
 
[0.4154] [0.1367] 
    excellent 1.6807** 1.5371** 
 
1.7114*** 1.5683** 
 
3.0316** 2.4475** 
 
(0.6572) (0.6601) 
 
(0.6555) (0.6568) 
 
(1.2714) (1.1643) 
 
[1.6807] [1.5371] 
 
[1.7114] [1.5683] 
 
[3.0316] [2.4475] 
    superior -0.4480 -0.2086 
 
-0.4401 -0.2093 
 
-0.7886 -0.4179 
 
(0.5426) (0.5680) 
 
(0.5453) (0.5703) 
 
(1.2230) (1.1593) 
 
[-0.4480] [-0.2086] 
 
[-0.4401] [-0.2093] 
 
[-0.7886] [-0.4179] 
SOH_wedge 8.1421*** 9.4386*** 
 
8.0229*** 9.4162*** 
 
31.9637*** 30.1851*** 
 
(0.3532) (0.4103) 
 
(0.3721) (0.4136) 
 
(1.9041) (1.8182) 
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] 
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] 
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] 
recent_sale 0.1696 0.2341 
 
0.2175 0.2655 
 
0.1125 0.1736 
 
(0.1665) (0.1860) 
 
(0.1776) (0.2010) 
 
(0.3090) (0.2926) 
 
[0.1697] [0.2342]   [0.2175] [0.2655]   [0.1125] [0.1735] 
R-squared 0.1213 0.1224 
 
0.1203 0.1219 
 
0.0434 0.0364 
Observations 9163 7616 
 
9163 7616 
 
9163 7616 
First-stage F 
   
45 44 
   Endog Test 
            Statistic 
   
1.177 0.213 
       p-value       0.278 0.645       
         
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the 
block group level. Numbers in brackets are changes in probability from moving a continuous variable from the 
25th to the 75th percentile of its distribution, holding all other variables at their mean values. In the case of a 
binary variable changes reported are from moving the value from 0 to 1, again holding all other variables at their 
means. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table 7 
The Differential in the Expected Percentage Reduction in Assessed Value 
Between Low- and High-Priced Neighborhoods Attributable to the Tax Representative 
    
  
  
Predicted  
Probability of  
Appeal  
(A) 
Predicted Percent 
Reduction in 
Assessed Value  
(L) 
Expected Percent 
Reduction in 
Assessed Value 
(A*L) 
2007 
   
 
Low-Priced Neighborhood 0.0406 5.0884 0.2066 
 
High-Priced Neighborhood 0.0498 5.0919 0.2536 
2008 
   
 
Low-Priced Neighborhood 0.0425 5.2033 0.2211 
  High-Priced Neighborhood 0.0511 5.2119 0.2663 
     
Note: A and L predictions are based on the differential presence of tax representatives in low-
priced and high-priced neighborhoods. 
 
